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Abstract 
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), designed to assess the ability to inhibit intuition to 
process a problem analytically, predicts people’s performance in many normative judgment 
and decision-making tasks (e.g., Bayesian reasoning, conjunction fallacy, ratio bias). 
However, how the CRT predicts normative decision-making performance is unclear, and 
little is known about the extent to which the CRT predicts real-life decision outcomes. We 
investigate the role of CRT in predicting real-life decision outcomes and examine whether the 
CRT predicts real-life decision outcomes after controlling for two related individual 
differences: the Big Five personality traits and decision-making styles. Our results show that 
greater CRT scores predict positive real-life decision outcomes measured by the Decision 
Outcome Inventory. However, the effect size was small, and the relationship became non-
significant after statistically controlling for personality and decision-making styles. We 
discuss the limited predictive role of cognitive reflection in real-life decision-making 
outcomes, along with the roles of personality and decision-making styles.  
Key words: cognitive reflection, decision outcome, decision-making styles, personality, 
individual differences. 
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Introduction 
Three factors determine decision-making quality: the nature of the decision, the situation in 
which the decision is made, and the characteristics of the decision-maker (Einhorn, 1970; 
Hunt, Krzystofiak, Meindl, & Yousry, 1989). The influence of the characteristics of the 
decision-maker have primarily been investigated in relation to normative decision-making 
performance, and hence aimed to assess the characteristics that predict compliance with 
normative decision-making principles derived from logic or theoretical models (e.g. the 
extensionality principle in the framing task, expected utility theory in the time preference 
task, Bayesian theorem in the Bayesian reasoning task). Currently, one of the key predictors 
of normative decision-making performance is the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), designed 
to measure people’s ability to inhibit a first intuitive answer to process information 
analytically (Frederick, 2005). This paper builds on previous research by investigating the 
extent to which the CRT predicts everyday real-life decision outcomes. 
The role of cognitive reflection in decision making 
Recent evidence (Frederick, 2005; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011; Toplak, West, & 
Stanovich, 2014) suggests that individual differences in the ability to engage in cognitive 
reflection is one of the most important predictors of normative decision-making performance.  
 In order to define cognitive reflection, it is necessary to clarify the cognitive framework in 
which it is rooted: dual system theory. The dual system theory posits that when making a 
decision, people can follow either their intuition (fast and frugal, known as System 1) or an 
analytical reasoning process (slower and more cognitively taxing, System 2) Epstein, 1994; 
Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich &West, 2000). For example, when 
choosing a house, some may rely on their gut feelings on whether one house is better than the 
others that they have looked at, whereas others may systematically and assiduously assess 
and compare a list of qualities associated with the different houses. Whilst there are many 
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debates about dual system theories (e.g., Krugrlansky & Gigerenzer, 2011; De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008), it is widely accepted that whilst intuitive processes typically activate first, 
they can be interrupted or over-ridden by conscious and analytical processes which in many 
situations lead to more optimal decisions (e.g., De Neys, 2006; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Cognitive reflection is that mechanism which regulates this 
interplay between intuition and deliberation as it denotes the ability, when appropriate, to 
interrupt the use of intuition and switch to a more deliberative thought process (Frederick, 
2005).  
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). The CRT is presented in the literature as a short but 
effective measure of the ability to inhibit a first plausible (and incorrect) intuitive answer so 
as to opt for the deliberative processing of information which is more likely to lead to a 
correct solution (Frederick, 2005; Toplak, et al., 2014). The CRT is composed of three simple 
questions, as follows: 
(a) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost? ____ cents 
(b) If it takes 5 machines 5 min to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to 
make 100 widgets? ____ min 
(c) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of 
the lake? ____ days 
The CRT predicts normative decision-making performance. CRT performance has been 
found to predict success in a number of normative decision-making performance tasks, 
including probabilistic reasoning (e.g., disjunction, conjunction, Bayesian tasks; Lesage, 
Navarrete & De Neys, 2013; Liberali, Jordana, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2011; Sirota et 
al., 2014; Sirota, Juanchich & Hagmayer, 2014) and inter-temporal choice (Nofsinger & 
Varma, 2008), risky preferences and over-confidence levels (Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 
7 
 
2009) or biases in probability judgments such as the denominators (Toplak, West & 
Stanovich, 2011; Toplak et al., 2014). 
 
Furthermore, it appears that when the impact of cognitive reflection on normative 
decision-making performance is assessed along with other individual difference variables, the 
CRT uniquely explains a substantial proportion of the variance (Toplak, West & Stanovich, 
2011; Toplak et al., 2014). For example, in an extensive investigation of the predictive power 
of cognitive reflection, intelligence, executive function and thinking dispositions on a rational 
thinking composite score (based on a set of 15 normative decision tasks), Toplak et al., 
(2011) found that cognitive reflection was the best predictor of normative judgments and 
decisions. The CRT explained 11.2% of the variance in the rational thinking score over and 
above intelligence, executive function and thinking dispositions.  
 Whilst the above studies serve to substantiate the positive relationship between 
cognitive reflection ability and normative decision-making in what are primarily laboratory 
tasks, we are not aware of any studies on the extent to which cognitive reflection ability 
influences the quality of decision outcomes in everyday life. Given that cognitive reflection 
predicts normative decision-making performance (Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011; Toplak 
et al., 2014), and that normative decision-making performance predicts real-life decision 
outcomes (r = .22, p < .001; Bruine de Bruin, et al., 2005) we hypothesise that cognitive 
reflection will predict real-life decision-making.  
What does the CRT actually measure? 
The CRT is a powerful predictor of normative decision-making performance. 
However, the reason why is unclear because what the CRT actually measures is a point of 
debate. There exist two non-exclusive accounts of what the CRT measures in the existing 
literature. 
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On one hand, some researchers stress that cognitive reflection measures a broader set 
of dispositions than originally suggested by Frederick (Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; 
Campitelli & Labollita, 2010; Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein & 
Pardo, 2012). The view is that the CRT assesses the tendency to be thorough and/or to 
actively engage in open-minded thinking (Baron, 1985) in addition to assessing the ability to 
inhibit a first intuitive answer. The main line of argument here is that people who perform 
better in the CRT do not necessarily engage in effortful System 2 thinking, but develop a 
more persistent and elaborate use of heuristics (Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Campitelli & 
Labollita, 2010, Cokely et al, 2009; Cokely & Kelley, 2009). According to this line of 
research the CRT measures not only the ability to inhibit an intuitive and incorrect answer, 
but also the ability to use intuition when it is appropriate. Viewed in this context cognitive 
reflection is a psychological device to select the cognitive processes most suited to a specific 
situation.  
On the other hand, other researchers have proposed a different and non-exclusive 
view stressing that the CRT assesses general knowledge as well as the inhibition of intuition. 
Specifically, given that the CRT is a set of three mathematical problems, it had been posited 
that it captures numeracy. Consistent with this, the CRT correlates positively with numeracy 
scales (Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Sirota & Juanchich, 2011; Weller et al., 2013). A more 
pronounced version of this view has led some researchers to use the CRT items as additional 
items in a numeracy test (Weller et al., 2013). However, evidence indicates that CRT items 
are distinct from those used in numeracy scales: an exploratory factor analysis including both 
numeracy and CRT items found that they loaded on separate factors (Liberali et al., 2012). 
Four further findings support that the view CRT is not simply another numeracy scale. First, 
the CRT predicts decision-making outcomes over and above numeracy (Cokely & Kelley, 
2009). Second, numeracy does not mediate the effect of the CRT on reasoning abilities 
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(Sirota & Juanchich, 2011). Third, CRT performance cannot be fully accounted for by 
numeracy (Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014). Finally, the CRT predicts performance in tasks that 
do not require numerical computations, such as guessing the nationality of a chest player 
(Campitelli & Labollita, 2010). 
Overall, evidence converges to suggest that the CRT does measure cognitive 
reflection (i.e. the ability to inhibit an intuitive answer), but that it also captures numerical 
abilities and other thinking dispositions (Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Campitelli & Labollita, 
2010; Liberali et al., 2011). The key finding of this line of research is that the extent to which 
the CRT predicts decision-making is via cognitive reflection but also by other individual 
differences that the CRT might capture such as general knowledge (e.g. geographical 
knowledge, Campitelli & Labollita, 2010; numeracy, Sirota & Juanchich, 2011) or by a more 
general disposition to activate or not heuristic processing when appropriate (Campitelli & 
Labollita, 2010). Building on these findings it can be expected that the CRT will predict real-
life decision-outcomes, but possibly less so than normative decision-making because the 
latter relies to a greater extent on numerical ability. 
 Indirect evidence indicates that cognitive reflection shares some variance with 
decision-making styles and personality. For example, cognitive reflection is related to 
cognitive styles (Frederick, 2005; Campitelli & Labollita, 2010) that are in turn related to 
both decision-making styles and personality traits (Dewberry et al., 2013a). The CRT is a 
performance measure, whereas personality and decision-making styles measures are typically 
self-report measures. However, there is evidence that decision-making styles and personality 
traits are related. In Dewberry et al.’s study, the avoidant decision-making style had a 
medium positive correlation with the personality trait neuroticism (r = .53), and a weak to 
moderate negative correlation with the personality traits of extraversion and openness (r = - 
26 and r = -17). Similarly, the decision style of vigilance was positively correlated with the 
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personality trait of conscientiousness (r = .36). If, as these findings suggest, decision-making 
styles and personality share some variance with cognitive reflection, it becomes necessary to 
control for these characteristics in order to establish their relative effects on real-life decision 
outcomes.  
Objectives 
This study focuses on how individual differences predict real-life decision outcomes by 
examining: (a) the extent to which cognitive reflection (i.e. the ability to inhibit a first 
intuition to follow a deliberative rule-based approach) predicts real-life decision outcomes, 
and (b) the extent to which cognitive reflection accounts for variance in these outcomes over 
and above personality traits and decision-making styles. 
 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 401 British participants took part in the study. The sample was recruited via a 
marketing agency and participants were rewarded with shopping vouchers for participating in 
the study. We excluded 17 participants from the sample because the time they took to 
complete the questionnaire was either less than 5 minutes or more than three standard 
deviations over the average (Min: 3 min., Max: 263 min.; M = 20 min., SD = 19 min.).  
The remaining 384 participants were aged between 18 and 85 years (M = 44.25, SD = 13.18; 
1 participant reported an age of 5 years and therefore this value was excluded). Fifty three 
percent of the participants were males, 82% were White British and 41.2% had a higher 
education degree. Overall, 15% indicated that they were unemployed and 13% that they were 
retired.  
Materials and Procedure 
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Participants completed an online questionnaire measuring cognitive reflection, decision-
making styles, personality, and real-life decision outcome. The order of presentation of the 
four measures was randomised for each participant.  
Predictors 
Cognitive reflection. The three items of the Cognitive Reflection Test were presented with 
the following instructions: Below are several problems that vary in difficulty. Try to answer 
as many as you can. The mean CRT score was 0.97 (SD = 1.11). These results are similar to 
those obtained by Toplak et al. (2011) and Frederick (2005). The items were presented to 
participants in a randomised order for each participant. Note that this version of the CRT has 
been criticised for its limited number of items, deemed to reduce its reliability (Toplak, West, 
& Stanovich, 2014). Very recently a revised version of the cognitive reflection test with four 
extra items has been developed (Toplak, et al., 2014). In the present study, the internal 
reliability of the original 3 item CRT was satisfactory (Cronbach’s alpha = .71) along with 
the distribution of scores, with slightly more than 50% of the participants who had at least 
one answer correct, skewness = .67 and kurtosis = -1.01.  
Decision-making styles. We measured a total of 10 decision-making styles, which represents 
a comprehensive sample of generic decision-making style measures (Dewberry et al., 2013b). 
We chose not to include measures that were context specific (e.g., career decision-making 
style). Nine of the decision-making styles were measured with items derived from the 
Decision Styles Questionnaire (DSQ) developed by Leykin and DeRubeis (2010; 43 items): 
anxious (5 items, e.g. ‘I feel very anxious when I need to make a decision.’), avoidance (5 
items, e.g. ‘I don’t make decisions unless I really have to.’), brooding (5 items, e.g. ‘When I 
make decisions, my top priority is to not get “burned.”’), dependent (6 items, e.g. ‘I need the 
assistance of other people when making important decisions.’), vigilance (6 items, e.g. ‘I like 
to consider all the alternatives.’), intuition (5 items, e.g. ‘When I make decisions, I tend to 
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rely on my intuition.’), spontaneity (4 items, e.g., ‘I make impulsive decisions.’), confident (5 
items, e.g., ‘I have faith in my decisions.’) and respected (2 items, e.g. ‘Others seek my help 
in making their decisions.’). In addition, we also included the revised version of Diab’s et al. 
(2008) Maximization Tendency Scale developed by Weinhardt, Morse, Chimeli and Fisher 
(RMTS; 2012). This scale features 6 items, such as ‘I don’t like having to settle for good 
enough.’ All the decision-making style responses were collected on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from Strongly disagree to Strongly agree. The two questionnaires concerned with 
decision-making styles were presented on different pages and in a randomised order for each 
participant.  
Personality. The Big Five personality traits were assessed with the short version of the IPIP 
Big-Five factor markers (50 items; Goldberg et al., 2006; Gow, Whiteman, Pattie, & Deary, 
2005). Each personality trait was assessed by 10 items: extraversion (e.g. ‘I make friends 
easily’), agreeableness (e.g, ‘I make people feel at ease’), conscientiousness (e.g. ‘I pay 
attention to details’), emotional Stability (e.g. ‘I rarely get irritated’) and intellect (e.g. ‘I 
enjoy hearing news ides’). The items within the personality questionnaire were randomised 
for each participant. 
 All the scales had satisfactory reliability with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .71 to 
.91 (see third column of Table 1). Summation indexes were computed for the personality 
traits, decision-making styles and cognitive reflection. 
 
 
Outcome variable 
Decision outcome in everyday life. Decision outcome in everyday life situations was 
assessed by means of the Decision Outcome Inventory (DOI; Bruine de Bruin, et al., 2007; 
Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). The DOI is a self-reported measure of decision-making outcome. 
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The items measured whether participants had experienced any of 41 negative outcomes over 
the past 10 years (Cronbach’s alpha = .88). For 34 of those outcomes, a preceding question 
assessed whether participants had had a chance to experience this outcome. For example the 
question: “In the last 10 years, have you ever taken a trip by airplane” preceded the question 
“In the last 10 years, have you ever missed a flight”. Participants simply responded yes or no. 
Some of the items of the original North American version of the DOI were adapted for a 
British audience as in Dewberry et al. (2013a). For example, “dollars” was replaced by 
“pounds”, “having a DUI” was replaced by “having a fine for drunk driving”.  
Decision performance score computation. The DOI scores were derived as recommended 
by Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007). Each outcome was coded into three categories: missing 
value; outcome not possibly experienced; 0 outcome avoided; or 1 outcome experienced. 
Then, each outcome score was multiplied by the percentage of people who avoided it. We 
then computed an average of all the weighted outcome scores for each participant. Finally, 
this weighted average was subtracted from 0. DOI scores therefore ranged from -1 to 0. The 
DOI responses were weighted by the proportion of individuals who did not experience the 
target outcome, as a proxy for a severity weighting (i.e., more severe outcomes were 
experienced less frequently and received a greater weight). Greater DOI scores represent a 
greater number of negative outcomes that participants successfully avoided and therefore 
indicate more positive decision outcomes.  
In the DOI, participants reported experiencing on average 25 of the 34 negative 
outcomes. For example, 12% of the participants reported having missed a flight, 33% 
reported having ruined their clothes because of not following washing instructions, and 40% 
had received blisters from sun burn. The average weighted real-life decision outcome score 
was similar to the one observed in Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007): M = -.13, SD = .12 in the 
present sample, as compared to M = -.15, SD = 0.1 observed by Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007). 
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Results 
Cognitive reflection predicts real-life decision outcome. 
Cognitive reflection was positively correlated with decision-making outcome (r = .14). The 
zero-order correlations between these scales, along with their reliability coefficients and 
descriptive statistics, are presented in Table 1. A regression analysis of CRT on DOI scores 
indicates that cognitive reflection accounted for 2% of the variation in real-life decision 
outcomes, F(1, 383) = 7.54, p = .006, R
2
 = .02, Standardised Beta = .14).  
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
Effect of cognitive reflection while controlling for personality and decision-making 
styles. 
 The correlation table shows some statistically significant correlations between 
personality, decision-making styles and cognitive reflection indicating that these variables 
share some variance. Cognitive reflection was significantly correlated with one of the five 
personality traits (a small negative correlation with extraversion), and to two of the ten 
decision-making styles (negative correlations with the intuitive and spontaneous decision-
making styles).  
To test whether the CRT predicted decision-making outcomes while controlling for 
decision-making style and personality, we conducted a regression analysis with real-life 
decision outcome as the outcome variable and the following 16 variables as predictor 
variables: the CRT, the 5 personality variables, and the 10 decision-making style variables. 
We also conducted a commonality analysis to assess the variance in the DOI explained by the 
CRT that was unique or common to other variables in the regression analysis using the R 
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package recommended by Nimon, Lewis, Kane and Haynes (2008). The outputs of the 
regression analysis and the commonality analysis are shown in Table 2.  
The regression analysis showed that cognitive reflection did not uniquely predict 
decision-making outcomes after controlling for personality and decision-making styles. CRT 
scores accounted for 2% of the variance in real-life decision outcomes but this was not 
statistically significant (p = .076). The commonality analysis indicates that out of the 2% of 
variance explained by the CRT, 1% of variance was common to one or more of the other 
predictive variables and 1% of variance was unique.  
The results also indicate that the personality traits of extraversion and 
conscientiousness uniquely predicted decision outcome scores. Conscientiousness had a 
positive relationship with decision outcome, whereas extraversion had a negative one. The 
other personality traits and decision-making styles did not significantly predict real-life 
decision outcome. 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
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Table 2. 
Findings of the regression analysis showing how CRT predict real-life decision outcome 
while controlling for the effect of the big five personality traits and decision-making styles (N 
= 384) along with output of the commonality analysis showing the unique and common and 
variance of DOI explained by cognitive reflection, personality traits and decision-making 
style. R² = .11. 
Predictor variables B Stand. Beta 95% CI p Unique Common 
CRT .01  .09 [.00, .02] .076 .01 .01 
Emotional stability -.01 -.03 [-.28, .13] .619 |.01| < .01 
Extraversion -.02 -.15 [-.03, .02] .026 .01 -.01 
Openness |.01| < -.01 [-.05, .00] .801 |.01| < |.01| < 
Agreeableness .01 .04 [-.02, .02] .484 |.01| < .02 
Conscientiousness .03 .16 [-.02, .03] .029 .01 .03 
Vigilant .02 .08 [.00, .05] .224 |.01| < .01 
Intuitive -.01 -.06 [-.01, .04] .305 |.01| < .01 
Spontaneous |.01| < -.02 [-.03, .01] .731 |.01| < .02 
Avoidant |.01| < -.01 [-.02, .01] .890 |.01| < .02 
Dependent |.01| < .01 [-.02, .02] .871 |.01| < |.01| < 
Anxious -.01 -.07 [-.02, .02] .462 |.01| < .02 
Brooding -.01 -.07 [-.03, .01] .301 |.01| < .02 
Confident |.01| < -.01 [-.03, .01] .951 |.01| < .02 
Respect |.01| < -.03 [-.03, .03] .596 |.01| < |.01| < 
Maximisation -.01 -.06 [-.02, .01] .291 |.01| < |.01| < 
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Discussion 
We investigated whether the Cognitive Reflection Test, designed to measure the ability to 
inhibit intuitive thinking to carry out analytical information processing, predicted real-life 
decision outcomes and whether it did so over and above personality and decision-making 
styles. Participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and the Decision 
Outcome Inventory (DOI) and provided self-reported judgment assessing the Big Five 
personality traits and decision-making styles. 
CRT predicts real-life decision outcome – but very little, and not over and above 
personality traits and decision-making styles 
Data showed that cognitive reflection positively predicts real-life decision outcomes. 
This result is in line with the results of Campitelli and Labollita’s (2010) study showing that 
the CRT predicted responses to questions not involving numerical calculations (such as 
guessing the nationality of a set of chess players). The finding is also consistent with the 
positive correlation found between cognitive reflection and normative decision performance 
(Lesage et al., 2013; Liberali, et al., 2011; Nofsinger & Varma, 2008; Oechssler, et al, 2009; 
Sirota & Juanchich, 2011; Sirota et al., 2014, Toplak et al., 2011; Toplak et al., 2014). 
Despite this, it is important to note that the CRT only explained 2% of the variance in real-
life decision outcome. 
Furthermore, the present findings indicate that the CRT does not predict real-life 
decision outcomes over and above personality and decision-making styles. Previous research 
has controlled for many variables to assess the effect of CRT (intelligence, executive 
functions, thinking dispositions; Toplak et al., 2011), but none to our knowledge accounted 
for the role of personality and decision-making styles along with the CRT. Future research 
replicating the present design with a set of normative decision-making tasks would make it 
possible to directly compare the effect of CRT in the two types of tasks.  
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After considering correlation magnitudes it appears that the CRT is more strongly 
correlated with measures of normative decision performance than with a measure of real-life 
decision outcome. We also note that whilst Toplak et al., (2011, 2014) found medium size 
correlations (.30 < rs < .42) between CRT and a composite score of normative decision-
making, the correlation between cognitive reflection and real-life decision outcome was two 
to three times smaller in the present study (r = .14). 
How our findings inform the debate on the nature of CRT 
The CRT predicted real-life decision outcome when it was considered in isolation, but 
not when we controlled for the effect of personality and decision-making styles. This 
indicates that the impact that the CRT has on real-life decision-outcome may be explained by 
the variance that the CRT shares with shares personality and decision-making styles.  
The present findings show that cognitive reflection shares some variance with 1 
personality trait out of 5 (extroversion, r = -11) and 2 decision-making styles out of 10 
(intuitive and spontaneous decision-making styles, r = -.15 and r = -.12). In addition, the fact 
that there were only two statistically significant correlations between the CRT and the 10 
decision-making styles, and that those correlations were small, does not support the view that 
the CRT can be considered as a thinking disposition as suggested by Cokely and Kelley 
(2009) or Campitelli and Labolita, (2010).  
One possible explanation for the small predictive power of the CRT on a set of real-
life decision outcomes, and of the difference of predictive value of the CRT on normative and 
real-life decision outcomes, is that most normative decision-making tasks require more 
numerical computation (e.g., computing a conditional probability) than the real-life decisions 
measured in our study (e.g., receiving a fine, losing your keys). This supports the position 
that the ability of the CRT to predict normative decision-making can be explained by the fact 
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that it captures numeracy as well as cognitive reflection (Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Sirota 
& Juanchich, 2011; Sirota et al., 2014; Weller et al., 2013).  
The present findings, taken together with previous findings on the impact of the CRT 
on decision performance, suggest that normative and real-life decisions have different 
determinants. For example, cognitive reflection strongly predicts normative decision 
performance (Toplak et al., 2011; Toplak et al., 2014) but only weakly predicts real-life 
decision making outcomes. Conversely, but still illustrating an asymmetry, whilst the Big 
Five personality traits were not found to correlate with in-lab normative decision-making 
tasks (i.e., Iowa gambling task; Brand & Altstötter-Gleich, 2008) some personality traits have 
been found to be associated with real-life decision performance in the present study and in 
Dewberry et al. (2013a). Interestingly, previous research (Bruine de Bruin et al, 2007) also 
found a weak or no correlation between performance in normative decision making and real-
life outcomes (from r = .03, p > .05 for the framing task to r = .26 in the decision rule task).  
Limitations 
In the present study we measured real-life decision outcomes using the Decision 
Outcome Inventory (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2005). The DOI measures the number of negative 
outcomes that people report experiencing in the last 10 years, weighed by the frequency of 
occurrence of the outcomes (used as proxy for the controllability and severity of the 
outcomes). The assessed decision outcomes cover a wide range of contexts including finance 
(e.g., having a cheque bounced), leisure (e.g., having sun burns), personal relationships (e.g., 
been divorced), and safety (e.g., receiving a fine for drunk driving). This variety can be seen 
as a strength, because it means that the DOI score is a generic measure of decision-making 
quality that is not bounded to a specific context. However, diversity can also be seen as a 
weakness, because the score is based on a set of outcomes that are not all related to each 
other and that may have different determinants. For example, losing keys is a different 
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outcome from divorcing, occasional absent-mindedness would certainly be more likely to 
cause one than the other. Finally, one could argue that the DOI only measures half of what 
makes a good decision-maker: the ability to avoid bad outcomes. The ability to generate good 
decision outcomes would be an interesting and straightforward indicator of decision-making 
quality. For example, the negative outcome ‘quit a job’ could be paired with the positive 
outcome ‘being promoted’. A more holistic approach to decision outcomes could also focus 
on good outcomes to provide a more comprehensive picture of real-life decision outcome.  
Determinants of real-life decision role of personality and decision-making styles 
Our results emphasise the role of the Big Five personality traits in predicting everyday 
decision outcome. Personality was the only predictor of real-life decision outcome after 
controlling for CRT and decision-making styles (7.2%). An increase of 1 unit in extroversion 
was associated with a decrease of 0.02 units in decision outcome. An increase of 1 unit in 
conscientiousness was associated with an increase of 0.03 units in decision outcome. Post-
hoc calculations based on the total number of negative outcomes experienced, divided by the 
weighed DOI scores, help us understand the meaning of the variation in the DOI scores. This 
computation translated DOI score variations in a rough number of negative outcomes 
avoided. On average, two decimals of the DOI score (0.02) reflect the avoidance of an extra 
negative outcome, therefore scoring one unit higher on the conscientiousness scale was 
associated with failing to avoid one extra negative outcome and an increase of 1 unit in 
conscientiousness was associated with avoiding successfully 1.5 negative outcomes.  
In the present study, 8 out of 10 decision-making styles were correlated with real-life 
decision outcomes, which is consistent with the findings of Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) and 
Dewberry et al. (2013a). However, findings also show that this predictive ability did not hold 
when personality and CRT were taken into account.  
Conclusion 
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The gap observed between the predictive value of cognitive reflection in normative 
decision task (e.g., framing tasks, conjunction tasks, ratio bias, Bayesian reasoning) and real-
life decision outcomes (e.g., I got blisters from sun burns, I lost my keys) calls for caution in 
extrapolating findings from normative decision-making tasks. The present study has provided 
evidence that although cognitive reflection predicts real-life decision outcome, it does not do 
so  after controlling for decision-making styles and personality. Results show that the CRT 
shares a limited variance with personality and decision-making styles, but that this variance 
partly explains the effect of CRT on real-life decision outcomes. 
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Table 1. Correlation matrix between decision outcome, personality, decision-making styles and cognitive reflection and (N = 384). 
  
 Measures 
M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 
1 
DOI 
DOI 
-.13 .12 -- -- .14 -.12 -.08 -.02 .15 .19 .13 -.11 -.15 -.13 -.05 -.13 -.14 .13 .00 -.04 .30 
2 CRT .97 1.11 .71 .14 -- -.09 -.11 .04 -.02 .01 .03 -.15 -.12 .02 -.08 -.05 -.08 .05 -.06 -.07 .10 
3 Emo. stability 2.84 .77 .87 -.12 -.1 -- -.48 -.17 -.38 -.51 -.18 .00 .05 .43 .12 .53 .31 -.50 -.27 -.15 -.25 
4 Extraversion 3.01 .69 .85 -.08 -.11 -.48 
 
-- .32 .13 .35 .06 .07 .20 -.34 .03 -.35 -.15 .32 .35 .28 .03 
5 Openness 2.92  .37  71 -.02 .04 -.17 
 
.32 
 
-- .21 .08 .19 .08 .04 -.09 .06 -.12 -.02 .11 .21 .11 -.02 
6 Agreeableness 3.55 .58 .80 .15 -.02 -.38 .13 .21 -- .46 .25 -.02 -.20 -.22 .16 -.19 -.17 .24 .17 .02 .15 
7 Conscientiousness 3.49 .65 .84 .19 .01 -.51 .35 .08 .46 -- .33 .01 -.11 -.54 -.06 -.43 -.24 .52 .33 .32 .20 
8 Vigilant 2.66 .86 .90 .13 .03 -.18 .06 .19 .25 .33 -- .01 -.38 -.20 .14 -.08 .12 .35 .33 .21 .13 
9 Intuitive 3.22 .70 .85 -.11 -.15 .00 .07 .08 -.02 .01 .01 -- .38 -.05 .01 -.03 .07 .18 .10 .15 -.03 
10 Spontaneous 2.77 .88 .90 -.15 -.11 .05 .20 .04 -.20 -.11 -.38 .38 -- .04 -.06 -.01 .08 -.03 .12 .01 -.13 
11 Avoidant 3.85 .59 .90 -.13 .02 .43 -.34 -.09 -.22 -.54 -.20 -.05 .04 -- .32 .73 .43 -.66 -.31 -.15 -.18 
12 Dependent 2.83 .80 .86 -.05 -.08 .12 .03 .06 .16 -.06 .14 .01 -.06 .32 -- .41 .30 -.31 .10 -.04 -.15 
13 Anxious 3.36 .60 .79 -.13 -.05 .53 -.35 -.12 -.19 -.43 -.08 -.03 -.01 .73 .41 -- .52 -.69 -.32 -.16 -.23 
14 Brooding 2.92 .69 .73 -.14 -.08 .31 -.15 -.02 -.17 -.24 .12 .07 .08 .43 .30 .52 -- -.43 -.03 .02 -.17 
15 Confident 3.72 .76 .88 .13 .05 -.50 .32 .11 .24 .52 .35 .18 -.03 -.66 -.31 -.69 -.43 -- .43 .28 .20 
 16 Respect 3.35 .87 .88 .00< -.06 -.27 .35 .21 .17 .33 .33 .10 .12 -.31 .10 -.32 -.03 .43 -- .28 -.02 
17 Maximisation 3.18 .61 .77 -.04 -.07 -.15 .28 .11 .02 .32 .21 .15 .01 -.15 -.04 -.16 .02 .28 .28 -- -.02 
18 Age 44.25 13.18 -- .30 .10 -.25 .03 -.02 .15 .20 .13 -.03 -.13 -.18 -.15 -.23 -.17 .21 -.02 -.02 -- 
Note: DOI: Decision Outcome Inventory; CRT: Cognitive reflection test. All correlations greater than |.11| are significant at p < .05, .12 < .02 and correlations 
greater than .17 < .001.
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Table 2. 
Findings of the regression analysis showing how CRT predict real-life decision outcome 
while controlling for the effect of the big five personality traits and decision-making styles (N 
= 384) along with output of the commonality analysis showing the unique and common and 
variance of DOI explained by cognitive reflection, personality traits and decision-making 
style. R² = .11. 
Predictor variables B Stand. Beta 95% CI p Unique Common 
CRT .01  .09 [.00, .02] .076 .01 .01 
Emotional stability -.01 -.03 [-.28, .13] .619 |.01| < .01 
Extraversion -.02 -.15 [-.03, .02] .026 .01 -.01 
Openness |.01| < -.01 [-.05, .00] .801 |.01| < |.01| < 
Agreeableness .01 .04 [-.02, .02] .484 |.01| < .02 
Conscientiousness .03 .16 [-.02, .03] .029 .01 .03 
Vigilant .02 .08 [.00, .05] .224 |.01| < .01 
Intuitive -.01 -.06 [-.01, .04] .305 |.01| < .01 
Spontaneous |.01| < -.02 [-.03, .01] .731 |.01| < .02 
Avoidant |.01| < -.01 [-.02, .01] .890 |.01| < .02 
Dependent |.01| < .01 [-.02, .02] .871 |.01| < |.01| < 
Anxious -.01 -.07 [-.02, .02] .462 |.01| < .02 
Brooding -.01 -.07 [-.03, .01] .301 |.01| < .02 
Confident |.01| < -.01 [-.03, .01] .951 |.01| < .02 
Respect |.01| < -.03 [-.03, .03] .596 |.01| < |.01| < 
Maximisation -.01 -.06 [-.02, .01] .291 |.01| < |.01| < 
 
 
 
